

Message Text

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 USNATO 4943

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, PARM

SUBJECT: CSCE: CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES

GENEVA FOR USDEL CSCE

REF: USNATO 4765

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF PAPER ON ILLUSTRATIVE LISTS OF
MILITARY MOVEMENTS AND MANEUVERS ISSUED FOLLOWING OCTOBER 5
COUNCIL MEETING. FIVE ANNEXES MENTIONED IN TEXT ARE ILLUS-
TRATIVE LISTS TABLED BY VARIOUS DELEGATIONS AND ARE UNCHANGED
FROM PREVIOUS SUBMISSIONS. WE WILL POUCH ANNEXES TO WASHING-
TON AND ADDRESSEE POSTS.

2. BEGIN TEXT OF COVER NOTE:

CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES: ILLUSTRATIVE LISTS OF
MILITARY MOVEMENTS AND MANOEUVRES

NOTE BY THE CHAIRMAN

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THE ATTACHED REPORT WAS DISCUSSED BY THE COUNCIL.

2. IT WAS RECALLED THAT THE CSCE AGENDA ITEM OF MILITARY
ASPECTS OF SECURITY WAS A PARTICULARLY SENSITIVE SUBJECT MATTER,

REQUIRING ESPECIALLY CLOSE AND SPEEDY CONSULTATIONS IN BRUSSELS, AS WELL AS MILITARY ADVICE WHENEVER APPROPRIATE, BEFORE PROPOSALS WERE MADE BY ALLIED NEGOTIATORS IN GENEVA.

3. THE ATTACHED DOCUMENT IS NOT ENTIRELY AGREED:

(I) THE FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE RESERVED, FOR THE TIME BEING, HIS POSITION ON THE CONTENT OF THE PAPER.

(II) FOR THE REASONS GIVEN IN THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPH, THE US REPRESENTATIVE DID NOT AGREE TO AN INCLUSION OF MILITARY MOVEMENTS IN THE ILLUSTRATIVE LISTS.

4. THE UNITED STATES DELEGATION, FOR SUBSTANTIVE REASONS, BELIEVES THAT A DISTINCTION SHOULD BE DRAWN BETWEEN MANOEUVRES AND MOVEMENTS. THIS DELEGATION IS PARTICULARLY CONCERNED THAT CSCE PROVISIONS FOR PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR MILITARY MOVEMENT WOULD ADVERSELY AFFECT MOVEMENTS OF FORCES OF NATO COUNTRIES FROM EUROPE TO CRISIS AREAS. IT IS ALSO CONCERNED THAT A CSCE PROVISION FOR PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR MILITARY MOVEMENTS MIGHT IMPINGE UPON NEGOTIATION OF MOVEMENT CONSTRAINTS IN THE MBFR CONTEXT. THESE CONSIDERATIONS ARE SHARED BY THE ITALIAN DELEGATION(1).

(1) THE ITALIAN DELEGATION ALSO EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT THERE COULD BE A DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE COMMITMENTS TO BE ENTERED INTO AT THE CSCE REGARDING MANOEUVRES AND THOSE WHICH MIGHT BE CONTEMPLATED IN RESPECT OF MILITARY MOVEMENTS. WHEREAS THE NOTIFICATION OF MANOEUVRES REPRESENTS A CLEAR-CUT COMMITMENT, FOR MILITARY MOVEMENTS IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO CONTEMPLATE SIMPLY A BROAD UNDERTAKING TO BEHAVE IN SUCH A WAY AS TO AVOID SITUATIONS WHICH COULD GIVE RISE TO TENSION OR ENDANGER PEACE.

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THIS DOCUMENT INCLUDES: 5 ANNEXES

5. THE OTHER DELEGATIONS BELIEVE THAT THE ALLIED POSITION HELD IN HELSINKI, WITH REGARD TO THE DESIRABILITY OF PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF MILITARY MOVEMENTS, SHOULD BE MAINTAINED IN GENEVA. THESE DELEGATIONS, INDIVIDUALLY OR JOINTLY, HOLD THE FOLLOWING VIEWS:

(I) AS A GENERAL CONSIDERATION, IT IS BELIEVED THAT MENTION OF MILITARY MOVEMENTS IN PARAGRAPH 23 OF THE HELSINKI FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS WAS DUE MAINLY TO SUCCESSFUL WESTERN INSISTENCE AGAINST SOVIET RESISTANCE. IT WOULD APPEAR WRONG TO BACK OUT FROM

THIS POSITION NOW.

(II) AS REGARDS SUBSTANCE, MILITARY ASPECTS OF SECURITY CONTINUE TO BE CONSIDERED AS AN ESSENTIAL COROLLARY TO THE DISCUSSION OF POLITICAL ASPECTS OF SECURITY, GIVEN THE CLOSE INTERDEPENDENCE BETWEEN THE TWO. IF CBM'S ON MOVEMENTS WERE TO BE STRUCK FROM THE CSCE AGENDA, TOO LITTLE MILITARY SECURITY CONTENT WOULD REMAIN. FURTHERMORE, IT IS BELIEVED THAT IT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT TO DRAW A CLEAR DISTINCTION BETWEEN MOVEMENTS AND MANOEUVRES. THE DIVIDING LINE BETWEEN CBM'S IN A CSCE CONTEXT AND MBFR CONSTRAINTS COULD BE DRAWN IN CAREFUL NEGOTIATIONS. THE FORMER WOULD APPLY TO ALL OF EUROPE, BE VOLUNTARY IN CHARACTER, NOT DEFINED IN DETAIL, NOT SUBJECT TO VERIFICATION, AND PROBABLY BE SUPPORTED BY MOST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES. IN CONTRAST, THE LATTER WOULD APPLY TO SPECIFIED FORCES OR AREAS, BE OBLIGATORY, NOT RELYING ON CONFIDENCE ALONE, AND BE APPLICABLE ONLY TO PARTIES TO RELEVANT MBFR AGREEMENTS. IT IS FELT UNLIKELY THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD BE PREPARED TO ACCEPT MBFR MOVEMENT CONSTRAINTS WHILE REFUSING TO CONSIDER CMB'S ON MILITARY MOVEMENTS. RATHER, NEGOTIATIONS OF SUCH CBM'S MIGHT TEST SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS SERIOUSLY MILITARY ASPECTS OF SECURITY. AS TO ALLIED MILITARY FLEXIBILITY, IT IS FELT THAT IN A SITUATION OF CRISIS, ANY
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VOLUNTARY CBM WOULD BECOME OBSOLETE ANYWAY AND FULL FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT WITHOUT PRIOR NOTIFICATION WOULD BE RESTORED.

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6. AS REGARDS TACTICS TO BE PURSUED BY ALLIED NEGOTIATORS IN GENEVA, THERE IS CONSENSUS WITHIN THE ALLIANCE ON THE FACT THAT THOUGH, IN THE END, THERE IS LITTLE HOPE OF A CSCE AGREEMENT ON CBM'S REGARDING MOVEMENTS, THE NEUTRALS AND NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES CAN BE EXPECTED TO PRESS STRONGLY FOR IT, WITH THE SOVIET UNION OPPOSINGAO THE ONUS OF REJECTING CBM'S ON MILITARY MOVEMENTS COULD AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE PUT ON THE SOVIETS. MORE SPECIFICALLY IT WAS SUGGESTED, THAT GIVEN THE SOVIET OPPOSITION TO THE INCLUSION OF MOVEMENTS IN AN AGREEMENT ON PRIOR NOTIFICATION IT WILL PROBABLY BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE FOR ALLIED NEGOTIATORS TO START OFF THE NEGOTIATIONS IN THE SUB-COMMITTEE BY SEEKING TO OBTAIN SOVIET AGREEMENT TO THE PRINCIPLE THAT MOVEMENTS SHOULD BE TREATED ON THE SAME BASIS AS MANOEUVRES. MOREOVER, INSISTENCE ON AN EARLY DEFFINITION OF THE TWO TERMS, WHICH WOULD IN ANY CASE BE VERY DIFFICULT, MIGHT CAUSE THE RUSSIANS TO BE MORE RESTRICTIVE THAN THEY WOULD BE LATER ON. ALLIED NEGOTIATORS SOULD THEREFORE INDICATE THAT THEY DO NOT THINK IT IS FEASIBLE TO MAKE A MEANINGFUL DISTINCTION BETWEEN MANOEUVRES AND MOVEMENTS, BUT THAT THEY WILL BE PREPARED TO EXAMINE ANY DEFINITIONS THAT OTHER DELEGATIONS MAY PROPOSE; AND THAT MEANWHILE THE SUB-COMMITTEE SHOULD EXAMINE THE POSSIBLE MODALITIES OF PRIOR NOTIFICATION, BUT PRESENTING ILLUSTRATIVE LISTS, TAKING INTO CONFIDENTIAL

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ACCOUNT THE CONSIDERATIONS IN THIS REPORT.

(SIGNED) JOSEPH M.A.H. LUNS

END TEXT COVER NOTE

BEGIN TEXT OF REPORT:

CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES: ILLUSTRATIVE LISTS OF MILITARY MOVEMENTS AND MANOEUVRES TO BE PROVIDED BY THE ALLIED COUNTRIES WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE CSCE

REPORT BY THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE(1)

(1) THIS REPORT IS TO BE READ IN CONJUNCTION WITH ITS COVER NOTE.

I. INTRODUCTION

1. AS REQUESTED BY THE SENIOR POLITICAL COMMITTEE, THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE EXAMINED THE SUBJECT OF ILLUSTRATIVE LISTS

OF MILITARY MOVEMENTS AND MANOEUVRES, IN THE LIGHT OF THE COUNCIL'S DECISIONS (REFERENCE C-M(72)82) REGARDING THE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES TO BE NEGOTIATED AT THE CSCE. REFERENCE IS MADE IN PARTICULAR (A) TO SECTION II.A.1(C) OF ANNEX I TO C-M(72)82 WHICH SUGGESTS THAT, TO ILLUSTRATE THE KIND OF INFORMATION IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE TO FURNISH TO THE OTHER PARTICIPANTS IN THE CSCE, NATO MEMBERS MIGHT TABLE RECENT ANNUAL LISTS OF THEIR OWN FORCE MOVEMENTS AND MANOEUVRES AND INVITE OTHERS TO DO LIKEWISE; AND (B) TO THE MANDATE ON "CERTAIN MILITARY ASPECTS OF SECURITY" TABLED AT HELSINKI. NATO MILITARY AUTHORITIES CO-OPERATED IN THE WORK OF THE COMMITTEE.

2. THE COMMITTEE FELT THAT THE OBJECTIVES PURSUED BY NATO ALLIES IN PROPOSING THEIR LISTS COULD BE BETTER ACHIEVED IF THESE LISTS WERE BASED ON CERTAIN GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS AND THEIR CONTENT REFLECTED COMMON CHARACTERISTICS.

II. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

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3. IN DRAWING UP THEIR NATIONAL LISTS AND IN MAKING SELECTIONS FROM THE PAST MAJOR MILITARY MOVEMENTS AND MANOEUVRES IN WHICH THEIR FORCES HAVE TAKEN PART, THE ALLIED COUNTRIES MIGHT BEAR IN MIND THE FOLLOWING CONSIDERATIONS:

- THAT ADVANCE NOTIFICATION OF MILITARY MOVEMENTS AND MANOEUVRES SHOULD HELP TO DISSIPATE CERTAIN AMBIGUITIES WITH RESPECT TO MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN EUROPE;

- THAT WESTERN COUNTRIES WOULD LIKE TO RECEIVE FROM THE WP COUNTRIES COMPARABLE ILLUSTRATIVE LISTS CONTAINING THE SAME KIND OF INFORMATION AS THEIR OWN LISTS;

- THAT SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES MAY ARISE FROM UNNOTIFIED OR MISUNDERSTOOD MOVEMENTS OF FORCES;

- THAT THE SUGGESTED LISTS SHOULD BE KEPT STRICTLY IN A CSCE CONTEXT AVOIDING POSSIBLE CONFUSION WITH COLLATERAL CONSTRAINTS IN MBFR(1);

(1) SEVERAL DELEGATIONS POINTED OUT THAT THERE EXIST SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES IN MANY RESPECTS BETWEEN CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES IN AN CSCE FRAMEWORK AND MOVEMENT CONSTRAINTS IN MBFR; FOR INSTANCE IN THEIR VOLUNTARY OR COMPULSORY CHARACTER RESPECTIVELY; IN THE VERIFICATION REQUIREMENTS, IN THE POLITICAL OBJECTIVES; AND IN THE NOTIFICATION PROCEDURES. FURTHERMORE, IT WAS STRESSED THAT THE MOVEMENTS OF THE TROOPS WHICH WILL BE WITHDRAWN FROM CENTRAL EUROPE AS A RESULT OF MBFR AND BE REDEPLOYED IN THE USSR SHOULD BE SUBJECT TO MEASURES MUCH STRICTER THAN THEIR ADVANCE NOTIFICATION

- THAT ATTENTION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO THE FACT THAT
"MOVEMENTS AND MANOEUVRES" SHOULD BE INTERPRETED AS
CONVEYING GENERAL DESCRIPTIVE CONCEPT, NOT AS AN
ATTEMPT TO DRAW ABSOLUTE DISTINCTIONS;

- THAT, WHILE THERE SHOULD BE NO FORMAL REQUIREMENT TO
INVITE OBSERVERS TO EVERY MANOEUVRE LISTED, THE ALLIES
WHOL WISHED TO DO SO COULD INDICATE THESE MANOEUVRES TO
WHICH THEY WOULD BE WILLING TO INVITE OBSERVERS.
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III. FEATURES OF THE LISTS OF MAJOR MILITARY MOVEMENTS AND
MANOEUVRES

DEFINITION

4. THE WORDS "MANOEUVRES" AND "EXERCISES" ARE NOT INTER-
CHANGEABLE SINCE ALL MANOEUVRES ARE EXERCISES BUT NOT ALL
EXERCISES ARE MANOEUVRES. NOR SHOULD THE WORDS "MANOEUVRES" AND
"EXERCISES" BE USED AS AUTOMATICALLY INCLUDING "MOVEMENTS". IN
GENERAL TERMS THE DISTINCTIONS ARE THAT MOVEMENTS HAVE MANY
ASPECTS - MOVEMENT OF TROOPS, EQUIPMENT, INTO, OUT OF, OR WITHIN
AREAS, TEMPORARY OR PERMANENT, LAND, SEA OR AIR ETC.; MANOEUVRES
ARE NORMALLY TWO-SIDED ACTIVITIES OF REAL FORCES, TRAINED AND
EQUIPPED; EXERCISES INCLUDE MANOEUVRES BUT COULD ALSO REFER TO
EXERCISES OF UNTRAINED OR PAPER FORCES. IN GENERAL, MOVEMENT
NEED NOT BE A MANOEUVRE, BUT ANY MANOEUVRES IMPLY MOVEMENT OF

FORCES.

5. IN INITIATING DISCUSSIONS WITH THE WARSAW PACT ON THE SUBJECT OF PAST MILITARY MOVEMENTS AND MANOEUVRES WHICH HAVE BEEN OR COULD HAVE BEEN NOTIFIED, ALLIED GOVERNMENTS WOULD WISH TO AVOID ANY APPEARANCE OF A BLOC-TO-BLOC APPROACH. IT APPEARS CONFIDENTIAL

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THEREFORE NECESSARY THAT THE LISTS TO BE SUBMITTED AT THE COMMITTEE STAGE OF THE CSCE BE ELABORATED AND TABLED ON A STRICTLY NATIONAL BASIS. THIS SHOULD NOT HOWEVER PREVENT ALLIED COUNTRIES FROM INCLUDING MULTINATIONAL MANOEUVRES, BUT THEY SHOULD FOCUS ON THEIR PARTICIPATION AS INDIVIDUAL STATES RATHER THAN AS MEMBERS OF AN ALLIANCE.

6. THESE LISTS SHOULD INCLUDE MAJOR MOVEMENTS AND MANOEUVRES, WHETHER NATIONAL, BILATERAL OR MULTINATIONAL IN WHICH ALLIED FORCES HAVE PARTICIPATED IN EUROPE DURING ONE OR MORE RECENT CALENDAR YEARS. IT WOULD APPEAR NECESSARY TO INCLUDE IN THESE LISTS ONLY MOVEMENTS AND MANOEUVRES IN WHICH THE UNITS MENTIONED ACTUALLY PARTICIPATED ACTIVELY THUS EXCLUDING COMMAND POST TYPE EXERCISES. THE LISTS ARE MAINLY DESIGNED FOR NEGOTIATING PURPOSES AND ARE ILLUSTRATIVE IN NATURE AND MIGHT CONTAIN THE SORT OF DETAIL REFERRED TO IN PARAGRAPH 9 BELOW. IN PRINCIPLE THEY SHOULD INCLUDE ALL GROUND FORCES MOVEMENTS AND MANOEUVRES AS DEFINED IN PARAGRAPH 8 BELOW. MOREOVER, AS LARGE-SCALE MANOEUVRES FREQUENTLY INVOLVE ALL CATEGORIES OF FORCES, AIR AND NAVAL COMPONENTS CANNOT BE IGNORED IN THIS CONTEXT. AIR AND NAVAL MOVEMENTS SHOULD THEREFORE BE INCLUDED IN SO FAR AS THEY FORM PART OF JOINT OPERATIONS. MOREOVER, THE USSR IS ABLE TO STAGE LARGE-SCALE NAVAL AND AIR MANOEUVRES WHICH BY THEMSELVES CONSTITUTE DIRECT THREATS TO THE NATO AREA, AND SUCH MANOEUVRES CANNOT IN THIS CONTEXT BE NEGLECTED. IN ADDITION, IT MUST BE RECOGNIZED THAT OVERRIDING CONSIDERATIONS OF NATIONAL SECURITY MAY IN CERTAIN CASES PRECLUDE THE ADVANCE NOTIFICATION OF CERTAIN MOVEMENTS AND MANOEUVRES.

7. THE COMMITTEE ALSO DISCUSSED THE POSSIBILITY THAT NATO COUNTRIES THEMSELVES PRESENT AN UP-TO-DATE LIST OF RECENT WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES' MILITARY MANOEUVRES SHOULD THE LATTER BALK AT THE IDEA OF SUBMITTING THEIR OWN LIST TO THE CSCE.

SEVERAL DELEGATIONS WERE OPPOSED TO THIS IDEA EITHER BECAUSE THEY BELIEVED IT WOULD INVOLVE AN UNACCEPTABLE INDICATION OF ALLIED MILITARY INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITY OR BECAUSE THEY THOUGHT IT INCONSISTENT WITH THE SPECIFIC GOALS OF THESE MEASURES I.E. TO BUILD CONFIDENCE. OTHER DELEGATIONS HOWEVER DID NOT SHARE THESE OBJECTIONS.

IV. INFORMATION ON MILITARY MOVEMENTS OR MANOEUVRES
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8. AMONG THE FOREMOST ITEMS OF INFORMATION WHICH THE LISTS SHOULD PRODUCE WOULD BE THE MAGNITUDE OF THE FORCES BROUGHT INTO PLAY IN EACH CASE. ALLIED COUNTRIES AGREED THAT ONLY MAJOR FORCE MOVEMENTS AND MANOEUVRES WOULD REQUIRE PRIOR NOTIFICATION. THERE IS NO SINGLE DEFINITION OF "MAJOR" WHEN APPLIED TO MOVEMENT OF FORCES OR MANOEUVRES SINCE THIS DEPENDS ON A NUMBER OF CONCOMITANT FACTORS SUCH AS THE TYPE OF MOVEMENT, ITS LOCATION, ITS MAGNITUDE INCLUDING THE TYPE OF MATERIAL MOVED, ITS DIRECTION, THE EXISTING POLITICAL SITUATION IN THE AREA, ETC. HOWEVER, FOR INTERNAL GUIDANCE IN THE PREPARATION OF NATIONAL LISTS, ALLIED COUNTRIES COULD USE AS A YARDSTICK FOR GROUND FORCES' INVOLVEMENT THOSE MOVEMENTS AND MANOEUVRES WHOSE COMBINED STRENGTH EQUALS OR EXCEEDS THE LEVEL OF A DIVISION(1).

(1) IN THE VIEW OF DELEGATIONS IMMEDIATELY CONCERNED (SEE ALSO THE UNANIMOUS RECOMMENDATION BY THE MILITARY COMMITTEE IN DOCUMENT MCM-55-73) A UNIT MORE THAN BRIGADE STRENGTH WITH AIR AND/OR NAVAL SUPPORT COULD, HOWEVER, OPPOSITE NORTHERN NORWAY, CONSTITUTE A DESTABILIZING FACTOR AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE NOTIFIED. BY THE SAME TOKEN, IN THE VIEW OF OTHER DELEGATIONS CONCERNED, AN AMPHIBIOUS FORCE OF MORE THAN TWO BRIGADES IN THE BLACK SEA OR THE GREEK COASTAL AREA COULD BE CONSIDERED A DESTABILIZING FACTOR AND SHOULD CONSEQUENTLY BE NOTIFIED.

9. AS TO OTHER POSSIBLE INFORMATION THAT THE ALLIES COULD PROVIDE IN LISTING MILITARY MOVEMENTS, THESE WOULD INCLUDE THE NAME OF THE MANOEUVRE OR MOVEMENT, ROUGHLY THE NUMBER OF PERSONNEL INVOLVED, THE PURPOSE OF THE MOVEMENT, THE TIME-FRAME, THE AREA, THE DEPARTURE AND DESTINATION OF THE PARTICIPATING UNITS, THE UNIT DESIGNATION, THE PERIOD OF ABSENCE OF PARTICIPATING UNITS FROM THEIR NORMAL DUTY STATION. A GOOD EXAMPLE OF THE KIND OF INFORMATION WHICH THE LISTS MAY CONTAIN IS TO BE FOUND IN THE PRESS RELEASES OF NATIONAL OR NATO MANOEUVRES SUCH AS EXERCISE STRONG EXPRESS.

V. DEGREE OF ADVANCE NOTIFICATION

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10. PRIOR NOTIFICATION COULD BE GIVEN EITHER NOT MORE THAN 60 DAYS IN ADVANCE OR ON THE BASIS OF ANNUAL CALENDARS. THIS MATTER SHOULD BE FURTHER STUDIED BEFORE THE ALLIES ENTER INTO COMMITMENTS IN GENEVA.

VI. IMPLEMENTATION OF AN AGREEMENT

11. AS TO THE PRACTICAL WAY OF IMPLEMENTING AN AGREEMENT ON PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR MILITARY MOVEMENTS AND MANOEUVRES

IT WAS SUGGESTED THAT SUCH NOTIFICATION COULD BEST TAKE PLACE
BILATERALLY THROUGH NORMAL DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS.

VII. ILLUSTRATIVE LISTS OF MILITARY MOVEMENTS AND MANOEUVRES

12. ANNEX I CONTAINS THE DESIGNATIONS OF MILITARY MOVEMENTS
AND MANOEUVRES PROPOSED BY DELEGATIONS FOR INCLUSION IN NATIONAL
ILLUSTRATIVE LISTS. ILLUSTRATIVE LISTS OF MILITARY MOVEMENTS
AND MANOEUVRES PROVIDED BY DELEGATIONS ARE ATTACHED AS
ANNEXES II TO V. IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT THE NATO MILITARY
AUTHORITIES WILL PROVIDE THEIR COMMENTS ON THE SUGGESTED
MANOEUVRES BEFORE THE ILLUSTRATIVE LISTS ARE FINALIZED.

END TEXT OF REPORT.
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